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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Commissioner
v. Schleier:
MONETARY AWARDS
RESULTING
FROM CLAIMS OF
DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT OF 1967
(UADEA '') ARE NOT
EXCLUDABLE
FROM GROSS
INCOME FOR
PURPOSES OF
INCOME TAXATION.

Recently, the United
States Supreme Court held in
Commissioner v. Schleier, 115
S. Ct. 2159 (1995), that awards
resulting from claims of age
discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment
Act of1967 ("ADEA") may not
be excluded from gross income
for purposes of income taxation. In so holding, the Court
created a two-prong test which
must be satisfied before such an
award may. be excluded from
gross income. First, the cause
of action asserted by a taxpayer
must be sufficiently akin to a
traditionally recognized tort
and, second, the resultant damages awarded must be attributable to a personal injury or sickness.
Upon reaching the age
of sixty, Erich E. Schleier
("Schleier") was terminated
from his position with United
Airlines ("United") in accordance with existing company
policy. Subsequently, Schleier
filed a claim in the United States
District Court alleging that, in
terminating his employment,
United violated the ADEA. The
parties eventually entered into
a settlement agreement in which
Schleier received $145,629.
The terms of the settlement
agreement attributed one-half
of the award to back wages and
the other halfto liquidated damages.
On his 1986 federal income tax return, Schleier reported the back pay portion of
the award as part of his gross
income, but excluded the liquidated damages portion of the

award. After the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service ("Commissioner") issued
a deficiency notice citing
Schleier for failure to report the
liquidated damages portion of
the settlement as gross income,
Schleier sought relief in the
Tax Court. Schleier asserted
that the entire' award should be
excluded from gross income.
Relying on 26 U.S.C. §
104(a)(2), which provides an
exclusion from gross income
for damages received "on account of personal injury or sickness," the Tax Court held that
the entire settlement was excludable from gross income.
The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to clarify the uncertainty surrounding the issue of
taxability of ADEA awards.
The Court began hs
analysis by examining the purpose of the ADEA, which was
enacted to prohibit "arbitrary
discrimination in the workplace
based on age." Schleier, 115 S.
Ct. at 2162 (quoting Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 US. 575, 577
(1978); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 US. 111,
120 (1985)). Specifically, certain defenses notwithstanding,
the ADEAcondernns the termi. nation ofany employee between
the ages of forty and seventy
"because of such individual's
age." Id. (quoting29US.C. §§
623(a)(1) and631(a)). Aclaimant succeeding in an ADEA
action may receive a variety of
awards, including reinstate-
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ment, promotion and back wages. Id. (citing 29 US.c. §§
626(b), 216(b)). Additionally,
a claimant may recover liquidated damages, but "only in
cases of willful violations" of
the ADEA by the offending
employer. Id. (quoting 29
US.C. § 626(b)). Significantly, the majority noted, unlike
claims based upon tort law, the
ADEA "does not permit a separate recovery of compensatory damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress." Id.
(citations omitted).
In reversing the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court then
examined the statutory definition of "gross income," as well
as the permissible exclusions
therefrom. Id. at 2163. The
Court emphasized that in 26
US.C. §61(a), "gross income"
is broadly defined as including
"all income from whatever
source derived." I d. Section
104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, under which Schleier
argued his award was excludable, provides several exclusions from gross income, including an exclusion for "damages received ... on account of
personal injuries or sickness."
Id. Based upon the plain language of the statute, however,
the Court rejected Schleier's
position, holding instead that
neither the back wage portion
of Schleier' s award, nor the liquidated damages portion fell
within the purview of the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion. Id. at
2163-64.
The Court first reasoned
that Schleier's alleged injury,
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the termination of his employment due to his age, did not
constitute a "personal injury"
or "sickness" within the meaning of the Section 104(a)(2)
exclusion. Id. at 2164. As to
the portion of Schleier' saward
attributed to back wages, the
Court held that Section
104(a)(2) "does not permit the
exclusion of [Schleier's] back
wages because the recovery of
back wages was not 'on account of any personal injury
and because no personal injury
affected the amount of back
wages recovered." Id. Furthermore, the Court rejected
Schleier's contention that, his
back wages notwithstanding,
the liquidated damages portion
of his award fell within the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion as compensation for personal injuries.
Id. Relying on its decision in
Trans World Airlines v.
Thurston, the Court held that
"Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in
nature." Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at
2165 (citing Trans World Airlinesv. Thurston, 469US. 111,
125 (1985)).
Next, the Court examined Schleier's argument that
the Commissioner's regulation,
codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.1041(c) (1994), interpreting 26
US.C. § 104(a)(2), provided an
additional basis upon which his
award was excludable. Id. at
2165-66. In part, the regulation
expands upon exclusions expressly set forth in Section
104(a)(2) by interpreting the
statute as providing an exclusion based bt:oadly upon "tort

or tort type rights." Id. at216566. In rejecting Schleier's argument, the Court held that the
language of the regulation constituted an additional requirement which must be met in order for a recovery to be excludable. Not only must a settlement be "on account of personal injury or sickness," but it
must be based upon the assertion of "tort or tort type
rights." Id. at 2166.
Finally, the Court considered Schleier's contention
that the Court's decision in
United States v. Burke, 504
US. 229 (1992), supported the
argument that ADEA awards
are excludable from gross income. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at
2166. In Burke, the Court held
that awards resulting from
claims of discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 were not excludable
from income. Schleier, 115 S.
Ct. at 2166. The Burke Court
noted that its decision was
based, in part, upon the conclusion that the claim asserted
therein did not rest upon the
"tort or tort type rights" referenced in the Commissioner's
regulation interpreting 26
US.C. § 104(a). Schleier,115
S. Ct. at 2166. In so holding,
the Court indicated that it would,
in fact, recognize a claim based
upon "tort or tort type rights"
as excludable from gross income.ld. Accordingly, Schleier
argued that the ADEA was sufficiently distinguishable from
Title VII in two critical respects:
the ADEA, unlike Title VII,
allows for jury trials, as well as

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the recovery of liquidated damages.ld. at 2166. In rejecting
Schleier's argument, the Court
held that the distinctions advanced by Schleier were not
adequate to bring his claim within the scope of the statutory
exclusion.ld. at 2166-67. Essentially, the Court concluded
that an award under the ADEA,
which is devoid of the broad
range of compensatory damages available to tort claimants,
could not be recognized as an
"action based upon tort type
rights." Id. at 2167.
In sum, the Court held
that even if Schleier had, in
fact, succeeded in convincing
the Court that his claim constituted a tort type action,
Schleier's claim fell short of
satisfying the personal injury
prong of the statute. Id.
In Part I of her dissent,
Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Thomas, maintained that
age discrimination is, in fact, a
personal injury, and damages
from such an injury are proper1y excludable within the purview of26 U.S.c. § 104(a)(2).
Id. at 2167-68.
Justice

0' Connor noted that despite the
view of the majority that Section 104(a)(2) offers an exclusion for tangible, as well as intangible injuries, the Court nevertheless held that ADEA
awards are not excludable,
hence, suggesting that Section
104(a)(2) applies only to tangible personal injuries. Id. at 216869.
In Part II of her dissent,
Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justices Thomas and Souter,
criticized the majority for its
departure from precedent and
noted the Court's previous ruling in Burke that discrimination constituted a "personal injury." Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at
2169-70. Additionally, Justice
O'Connor maintained that the
broad range of remedies available to ADEA claimants "qualify an ADEA suit as a 'tort type'
action." Id. at 2170. Lastly,
Justice 0 'Connor expressed her
concern for the majority's failure to consider with appropriate deference the long-standing
IRS regulation interpreting the
statute.ld. at 2171-72.
In Commissioner v.

Schleier, the Supreme Court
expressed the view that age discrimination will not be recognized as a personal injury for
income taxation purposes.
While not immediately apparent, the impact of the Court's
decision is far-reaching for all
parties involved in the ADEA
claims process. For both individuals and employers involved
in an attempt to settle discriminationclaimsundertheADEA,
the Court's decision will certainly be a key factor in any
settlement negotiations, as no
portion of an ADEA settlement
is excludable from an individuai's gross income. Hence, in
the future, it appears that ADEA
claimants will seek higher monetary settlements in an effort to
secure a fair net settlement after
taxation. Thus, it is likely that
employers involved in the
ADEA claims process will bear
the cost of the Schleier decision.
-Carole N Roche'

The Great Seal of Maryland, first sent from England after colonial settlement, was
adopted by Joint Resolution in 1876. The reverse shows a shield with the Calvert and
Crossland arms supported by a farmer and a fisherman. The scroll contains a motto
usually translated "manly deeds, womanly words." Around the border, the Latin legend
reads "with favor wilt thou compass us as with ashield." On the bottom, the date, 1632,
refers to the year Charles I, King of England, granted the Maryland Charter to Cecilius
Calvert, second Lord Baltimore. The obverse of the Seal shows Lord Baltimore in
knight's armor riding a stallion.
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